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THE 'WINDMILL CASE': FACING UP TO APPROPRIATE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Terry J. Lodge* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Structure of the Electric Utility Industry 
The history of electric power production in the United States may 
be likened to the construction of the ancient pyramids. Beginning 
with the decentralized, small-scale coal and hydroelectric plants of 
the late nineteenth century, utility companies slowly merged into 
increasingly larger systems. By the 1920's, the General Electric com-
bine of John P. Morgan headed the list of holding companies which 
controlled this capital- and equipment-intensive industry} By the 
1930's, even while state regulatory agencies were guaranteeing mini-
mum rates of return to the power companies, the device of 
"pyramiding"-the purchase of controlling stock in holding compa-
nies so as to control all subsidiaries-resulted in an even greater 
centralization of ownership. 2 As utilities grew, these holding compa-
nies diversified their holdings, buying up coal fields, oil supplies, 
electric equipment factories, railroads, phone companies, and, inev-
itably, smaller utility corporations. A relatively small number of 
utility corporations took virtual control over the industry. 
The 1930's, '40's, and '50's saw competition being reintroduced 
into the power industry by means of federally-sponsored programs 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. 3 Modest congressional re-
forms during the New Deal era culminated in the Public Utility 
• Urban Planner, Dep't of Community Development, Toledo, Ohio. J.D., 1978, University 
of Toledo College of Law. 
I J. RIDGEWAY & B. CONNER, NEW ENERGY 53 (1975). 
2 [d. at 54. 
• [d. at 55. See 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (1970). 
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Holding Company Act,4 which broadened the federal Securities 
Exchange Commission's trust-busting powers and temporarily lim-
ited the control which the few held over the power industry.s Still, 
no less than four congressional studies in the past quarter-century 
have documented the excessively concentrated ownership by utili-
ties of generating capacity, transmission facilities, fossil fuel sup-
plies, and electrical equipment manufacturers.s 
Persistent centralization of control has caused the conventional 
electric service industry to be characterized by the phenomenon of 
"vertical integration." Electricity is most efficiently and economi-
cally produced, it is said, through utility control over generation, 
transmission, and surplus power sales among regions-control, in 
fact, over the entire process from production to consumption. More-
over, depending upon the generating demands of the moment, a 
single utility company may be simultaneously producing four dis-
tinct products which correspond to the markets extant within the 
electric industry.7 This phenomenon has led the body of utility regu-
latory law to hold the notion that centralized corporate production 
is the only way that economies of scale, capital pooling, and efficient 
power generation may be achieved. State utility regulation has 
effectively substituted centralized power production for competition 
among small suppliers.s When one contemplates the huge amounts 
of capital needed even to enter the industry, it would seem virtually 
impossible that new commercial generators could ever appear. 
B. Blowing in the Wind 
Against this background of utility structure, an obscure tariff case 
recently settled by the New York Public Service Commission (Com-
mission) has interesting ramifications for the future of corporate 
electrical production and transmission. Following administrative 
hearings in late winter, 1977, the Commission issued Special Per-
mission Order No. EL-1656.9 Behind that obscure, bureaucratic tag 
• 15 U.S.C. §79 et seq. (1970). 
• NEW ENERGY, supra note 1, at 63. 
• [d. at 65. 
1 These products are base load power, peaking power, reserve power, and economy power. 
See Garfield, Regulation, Competition and Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 
785,790. 
8 [d. at 799. 
• Based upon Item 209, S.A.P.A. EI-39, Filing by Consolidated Edison Company of New 
York, Inc., Amendments to Schedule P.S. C. No.8 - Electricity: Staff Report (March 23,1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Staff ReportJ. This document embodies the technical discussions be-
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hid a surprising confrontation: Consolidated Edison Company of 
New York, Inc. (Con Ed), one of the largest utilities in the nation, 
had taken on the owners of a small, windmill-powered electrical 
generator .10 
The insurgent device was not an ordinary farm windmill, how-
ever, but a generation-old "Jacobs" brand triblade, a dozen feet in 
diameter and capable of generating two kilowatts of usable house-
hold alternating electric current in sufficient wind conditions. II The 
machine's owners, occupants of a cooperatively owned apartment 
house in New York's impoverished Lower East Side,12 had hooked 
the offending machine directly into the building's electrical circui-
try which ordinarily drew its power from Con Ed. During periods 
when the mill was generating more current than was needed in the 
building, the surplus power flowed backward through Con Ed's 
meter, thus causing a rollback (decrease) in the meter's measure of 
electricity usage. This process, known as "backfeed," touched off 
the biggest head-on clash to date between conventional energy sup-
pliers and the tiny but growing number of individuals who have 
come to rely upon so-called "appropriate technology."13 Following 
extensive mediation between Con Ed and the cooperative, the Com-
mission amended Con Ed's rate tariffs to allow up to 25 windmill 
generators to hook directly into Con Ed's electrical grid for an exper-
imental period of time. This decision pioneered in the recognition 
of the practical application of alternative, self-renewing energy sup-
plies. 
Following upon the social and economic tenets of such economists 
and philosophers as E.F. Schumacher,14 appropriate technologists 
stress the use of small-scale, renewable, ecologically compatible re-
sources for energy, food, and fuel. The Lower East Side windmill 
was constructed with assistance from the National Center for Ap-
hind the Special Permission Order. The subject matter of the dispute settled by the Commis-
sion will hereinafter be cited as the Windmill Case. 
10 See PSC Order: Con Ed Must Buy Citizen Wind power, THE POWER LINE, June, 1977, at 
1. 
II See generally WIND POWER DIGEST, Dec. 1976, at 19. Briefly, a kilowatt expresses a 
quantum of 1,000 watts of electricity. A l00-watt light bulb, for instance, uses 100 watts (or 
1/10th kilowatt) at any given period. The typical middle-income single family household 
requires about 1 V2 - 2 kilowatts per hour at times of peak usage. 
I' Located at 519 East 11th Street, the co-op has been christened "the 11th Street Move-
ment" by observers. Moorhead, Rooftop Hydroponics Emerge as Gardens of the Future, THE 
BLADE, July 31, 1977, at C-1. 
13 See text at notes 14-15, infra. 
I. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAU'I1PUL (1973). 
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propriate Technology, a project of the U.S. Community Services 
Administration. The Center numbers among its widely-scattered 
demonstration projects such emerging approaches as household 
solar heating, urban greenhouses, practical garbage recycling, base-
ment hydroponics, and composting toilets. IS The aims of this move-
ment, to decentralize power and capital needs while increasing reli-
ance upon independent or semi dependent resources, pose an ob-
vious threat to the capital-intensive, concentrated public utility 
sector. 
The formal incorporation of backfeed power into a utility grid will 
create a hybrid entity: the electricity consumer will, for the first 
time in history, also be the electricity producer. This unique new 
role poses a number of economic and legal questions with which 
utility regulators have rarely, if ever, come to grips. This article will 
focus upon the history and future of wind energy as a technology, 
the specific findings of the Windmill Case in New York, and some 
of the legal and economic implications of the widespread use of 
small-scale power production. Ultimately at issue is the problem of 
re-establishing competition while maintaining operating efficiencies 
within the unusual utility structure which results from the inter-
connection of conventional and alternative technologies. 
II. WIND POWER 
A. The History of Wind Power 
The harnessing of wind power to economize upon human labor 
dates back at least 4,800 years to the ancient Egyptians, and per-
haps further.ls Electricity was first produced from wind power in 
1891 by Paul La Cour, whose inventions powered a Danish village 
for more than half a centuryY From the 1920's until well into the 
1950's, Marcellus Jacobs sold thousands of his patented "wind-
gennies" to America's remote western homesteaders to produce 
electricity. It was more than two decades after the founding of the 
U.S. Rural Electrification Administration in 1935 before these 
"Jacobs" were no longer competitive with commercial power gener-
ation. 
A pioneering example of commercial wind power was the massive 
" HOLDEN, NeAT: Appropriate Technology with a Mission, SCIENCE, March 4, 1977, at 
857. 
" W. CLARK, ENERGY FOR SURVIVAL 516 (1975). 
" [d. at 533. 
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1,250 kilowatt plant built in 1941, at Grandpa's Knob in the central 
Vermont mountains. 18 That particular adaptation of the technology 
produced an average 700 kilowatts for Vermont Public Service Cor-
poration during its 18-month generating life, until structural prob-
lems not related to electrical generation caused the mill to lose one 
of its eight-ton blades in 1943. The mastermind of the Vermont 
power station, Palmer C. Putnam, unsuccessfully sought aid from 
the federal government after World War IT to solve the problems of 
inadequately inventoried wind speed data and the tying of wind-
generated electricity into regional and national grids. 18 The postwar 
government, more concerned with traditional forms of economic 
expansion for returning GI's, was simply not interested in Putnam's 
vision.20 
B. Current Wind Power Technology 
The evolutionary improvement of inverters since the 1940's has 
made it possible today to hook up even small generators directly 
into incoming electrical lines. At least three advantages accrue from 
such an arrangement.21 First, utility power may be used to supple-
ment windplant generation, and it can be stepped up automatically 
as wind power declines or as household demand increases. Second, 
unlike many alternative energy systems, windmills do not require 
batteries and related inversion equipment, thus greatly reducing 
(by perhaps 40% to 50%) the costs of a wind system. Finally, effi-
ciencies are obtained by backfeeding excess wind-converted power 
directly into transmission lines rather than simply grounding out 
the surplus. To date, the technical arguments raised by Con Ed 
against the backfeed characteristics of the windmill hinge only peri-
pherally upon possible damage or overloads on utility equipment.22 
For the most part, Con Ed's opposition stems from concerns about 
the unpredictability of having to provide supplemental or reserve 
18 [d. at 541. Unlike Marcellus Jacobs' windplants which operated on a direct current (DC) 
basis, and fed a set of storage batteries, the commercial facility at Grandpa's Knob operated 
through an inverter-a device which converts DC into alternating current (AC)-which al-
lowed households to hook directly into the line without storage batteries or further processing. 
II [d. at 545. 
• [d. 
21 K. Bosley, Barriers to the Diffusion of Home-Sized Wind Energy Conversion Systems 
(WECS) Interfaced with Utility Lines, (1977) (unpublished paper at New Mexico State 
University). 
22 Staff Report, supra note 9, at 5. Interestingly, Con Ed "contends that the windmill 
operation is unknown but admits that in the case of other back-feed systems on the Con 
Edison Lines, damage is unlikely to occur." [d. at 10. 
496 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:491 
power when the wind generator is inoperable or providing insuffi-
cient energy. 23 
Several obstacles stand in the way of widespread household use 
of wind energy machines designed to backfeed. For one, equitable 
tariffs must be established-a fair price must be set for the wind-
produced power. Moreover, regulatory law must be changed in ways 
which will allow the entry of different sizes of windmills into the 
electricity market. Windmill generation on a wide scale must be 
anticipated in utilities' facility plans. Finally, regulatory policy 
must be revamped to ascertain what forms of regulation might af-
fect wind systems besides state public utility commissions. 
III. THE WINDMILL CASE 
A. Facts and Figures 
The economic settlement of the Windmill Case is a balancing act 
which reflects an intriguing battle of legal policies. 24 In rough terms, 
the conflict centers around whether or not Con Ed and the Public 
Service Commission staff would like to see wind power made eco-
nomically prohibitive by regulatory practice. 
In order to comprehend the rates imposed upon the windmill 
owners, some basic aspects of utility rate-setting must be under-
stood. The cooperatively-owned windmill25 was designed as an ad-
junct to the residential electrical system of a large apartment build-
ing. In New York, the apartment falls into Service Classification 
(Class) 226 which contains two components in its charge for service. 
One, a "minimum demand charge," is a minimum charge imposed 
by the utility on all customers of the class, and covers Con Ed's costs 
of maintaining plant capacity to service Class 2 customers at any 
given moment. 27 The second charge, a "minimum customer 
charge," is a basic amount billed monthly to the customer whether 
or not the customer takes any electricity. 28 Costs typically recovered 
23 Ohio utility officials have expressed concern for the safety of repairmen working on a line 
which the power company has taken out of service, but to which an unmuzzled wind generator 
is attached. Interview with Tom Nichols, Vice-President, Product Development Institute, in 
Toledo, Ohio (July 29, 1977) . 
.. The windmill owners were represented by Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney-General, 
among others. Holden, supra note 15, at 859. 
,. The legal owner is Energy Task Force, Inc. Staff Report, supra note 9, at 3 . 
.. Officially defined as "General-Small" by the Commission, Class 2 is applicable to the 
use of service for light, heat and power for general purposes where the customer's require-
ments do not exceed 10 kilowatts. [d., at 2. 
'¥1 Staff Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
28 [d. at 4. 
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by the "minimum customer charge" include relatively fixed expen-
ses to the utility, such as meter reading, billing, maintenance and 
overhead. 29 If the customer uses electrical service beyond a pre-
scribed level, a separate additional charge is made. 
The actual dollar terms of the settlement of the Windmill Case 
are fairly innocuous. A minimum demand charge was established at 
$6.80 per kilowatt per month (based on the windmill's peak output 
capability top of two kilowatts); $15.60 was set as the minimum 
customer charge; $1.00 was set for a separate meter which would 
record backfeed from the windplant into Con Ed's system, thus 
making it easy to credit accurately the cooperative's account for the 
prevailing wholesale cost to Con Ed of purchased electricity from 
other utilities. 30 
The owners of the windmill agreed to the minimum demand 
charge of $6.80 per kilowatt per month, but they hotly contested the 
$15.60 minimum customer charge. In a 1974 cost-of-service study, 
Con Ed had determined that $15.60 was the "real" cost of its fixed 
services, but the utility charged Class 2 customers only $4.96, letting 
other rate classes pick up the excess.31 For the windmill in Class 2, 
however, Con Ed demanded the full $15.60. The utility justified this 
differential treatment on the ground that the windmill cooperative 
was "attempting to avoid taking service and ... the full customer 
costs must be recovered."32 The owners countered that this charge 
was an undue penalty being assessed by the company to discourage 
windmill generators, and argued that Con Ed did not consistently 
recover its true per-customer costs from all customers within Class 
2.33 With little explanation, the Commission staff recommended, 
and the Commission members ruled, that the windmill owners nev-
ertheless "be required to compensate the utility, to some degree, for 
the costs incurred to supply [them]."34 The $15.60 minimum cus-
tomer charge was thereby imposed, seemingly contradicting the 
staffs finding that average electrical usage by Class 2 customers fell 
far below (at 536 kilowatt-hours per month, or more than 40%) the 
level of usage at which the customer would break even on a $4.96 
monthly charge for 1,000 kilowatt-hours.35 
" F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBlJC UTiUTY REGULATION 510 (1961). 
'" Staff Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
31 Id. at 4. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
a< Id. at 5. 
" Id. at 6. 
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Beyond the economic settlement, however, the windmill owners 
won a major victory-the limited recognition of the commercial 
potential of wind power. The Commission ordered Con Ed to make 
provisions for a one-year data-gathering and demonstration period, 
commencing in 1979, during which up to 25 similar household wind-
mills could be rigged directly into Con Ed's utility lines.36 
B. Consequences of the Decision 
The effect of the imposition of the $15.60 minimum customer 
charge could seriously hinder the economic acceptability of wind 
power for some time to come. A wind generator the size of that in 
the Windmill Case likely would cost several thousand dollars.37 The 
time it would take to recoup that purchase price through decreased 
electricity purchases from one's local utility could total five or more 
years.38 By simply making it $10 more expensive per month to hook 
up a windplant to utility lines, the period of time needed to break 
even on a windmill purchase may be extended by 50% or more, that 
is, to seven or more years.39 
There is also a subtle psychological factor in the use of the mini-
mum customer charge to surcharge the windmill owner. This more 
subtle effect was recognized by the Public Service Commission itself 
some years ago: 
Regardless of facts and figures, the consumer is apt to consider the 
service charge, for which he is allowed to use no substantial amount of 
gas, as a charge for which the company renders no service or such sma!. 
amount as to be negligible. It is frequently said to be 'something for 
nothing.' This viewpoint may be wrong, but the opposition to the service 
charge has led many utilities to abandon it. . . . In other words, the 
fundamental objection to the service charge is not so much economic or 
accounting as it is psychological. 40 
"1d. 
31 Interview with Tom Nichols, supra note 23 . 
.. 1d. 
31 [d. In Toledo, Ohio, a small business which was planning to market windmills with 
backfeed characteristics, Product Development Institute, was forced by the local electric 
utility to alter radically its inverter mechanism so that it would no longer backfeed but would 
simply cut off outside electrical service during the windmill's peak production periods. The 
effect of the changes, in terms of added technical components, combined with the loss of 
savings from backfeeding electricity, pushed the price of the firm's windmills from about 
$3,000 to nearly $3,600, and raised the amortization time from about 5-6 years to 7-8 . 
.. N.Y. PUBUC SERVICE COMMISSION REp. No. PUR 1931C (1931), RE RATES & RATE STRUC-
TURES OF CORPORATIONS SUPPLVlNG ELECTRICITY IN NEW YORK CITY, at 337 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
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In the case of the windmill, it is even more questionable whether, 
by imposing a higher customer charge, Con Ed was not in fact 
getting "something for nothing." The utility was collecting a pro-
portionately greater amount of its overhead expenses from the wind-
mill owners than from other Class 2 customers; yet, the windmill's 
backfeed lowered the proportionate demands on Con Ed power 
which would normally be expected from an apartment building. It 
is of further note that the "accepted rule" in evaluating discrimina-
tory rates is that "a utility may charge but one rate for a particular 
service, and any discrimination between customers as to the rate 
charged for the same service under like conditions is improper."41 
In the Windmill Case, the Commission should have looked be-
yond the classification of service to the actual characteristics of the 
customer. The setting here of what is unmistakably a rate class 
within a rate class raises a fundamental question as to whether the 
Commission denied the windmill owners equal protection of the 
laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 A counterargu-
ment to this claim, of course, would be that when legislation is 
promulgated to affect the public generally, there will inevitably be 
individuals who will be adversely affected. While this principle 
might frequently be true, common sense would render it inappro-
priate in the Windmill Case. First, the adjustment of the Class 2 
rate structure was clearly discretionary to the staff of the Public 
Service Commission which made certain economic decisions reflect-
ing a pronounced bias toward one specific type of user. Second, the 
effect of the discriminatory rate was to foreclose much of the dollars-
and-cents acceptability of wind power for a potentially indefinite 
period of time. 
In examining the Commission's findings, it is evident that the 
windmill owners did not attempt to litigate or appeal the minimum 
customer charge; they no doubt understood that a court test would 
forestall implementation of the 25-windmill experiment contained 
in the settlement. More important, it is speculative as to whether a 
future litigant on this equal protection question will appear. Even 
if one does, it is unclear whether the United States Supreme Court 
1\ See A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBIJC UTIIJTY REGULATION, VOL. 1 288 (1969). 
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1, cl. 4. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the courts identify 
the legislative distinctions drawn between persons or classes and then insure that the legisla-
ture has not used these distinctions to treat those similarly situated in a dissimilar manner. 
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Pro-
hibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1073-74 (1974) [herein-
after referred to as Nowak]. 
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will offer much relief. Because it is an economic interest, the Court 
would apply the least protective standard of equal protection re-
view.43 Thus, if the classification could reasonably further a legiti-
mate state interest, it will be upheld as founded upon a "rational 
basis."44 The windmill owners would carry a substantial burden 
which would require demonstrating that the difference in regulatory 
treatment ofthemselves and other Class 2 customers bore no reason-
able relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
Also to be considered is the historic reluctance of the judiciary to 
overrule expert administrative law determinations if supported by 
substantial evidence.45 Because of this doctrine and the dictates of 
the Administrative Procedure Act,48 courts will, in these settings, 
invoke a limited scope of judicial review. It is unlikely that a court 
will overrule the technical decisions of a public utility regulatory 
body. 
Yet another bone of contention in the arrangements for the wind-
mill was the "credit for self-generation,"47 the means by which the 
windmill owners would be compensated for its backfeed of excess 
electricity into Con Ed's lines. Under the revised tariff, Con Ed was 
to credit the cooperative based upon the average cost of fuel and 
purchased power for the month in which the excess generation was 
recorded. 48 The cooperative argued that this method would not ac-
curately reflect the intrinsic value of the windmill's energy, that is, 
the savings to Con Ed of not having to produce more power at peak 
.. Traditionally the Court has imposed two standards of review of legislative classifications. 
Under the least restrictive, state legislation is presumed constitutional if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). 
Where classifications are based on suspect criteria or where they infringe on fundamental 
rights, the Court shifts the burden to the state to demonstrate a compelling interest for such 
classification schemes. This latter standard is almost impossible to meet. See, Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). For a 
discussion of an evolving middle tier of equal protection review see Gunther, The Supreme 
Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Nowak, note 42, supra; Comment, 
The Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act: Judicial Alternatives for Exclusion-
ary Zoning After Arlington Heights, 6 ENV. An. 63, 66-68 (1977); Comment, Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc.: The War on Neighborhood Deterioration Leaves First Amendment 
Casualty, 6 ENV. An. 101, 104-05 (1977); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 
HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) . 
.. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also authorities cited in note 43, supra . 
•• See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See generally 4 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29.02 (1958 Supp. 1970) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). 
" Staff Report, supra note 9, at 6 . 
•• Id. 
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hours of the day.49 The owners were alluding to the fact that back-
feed from the windmill into Con Ed's lines during times of peak 
consumer demand would decrease the utility's costs of producing 
power during those periods. Since it costs Con Ed more at peak 
demand times to produce more power, the owners contended, the 
credit given the windmill for providing power at those times should 
be higher. 
The Commission staff agreed with these contentions, but dis-
missed the proposal on the ground that it would be prohibitively 
expensive to hook up to the windmill the sophisticated equipment 
that would correctly match the hourly output of the windmill with 
Con Ed's cost of fuel during those same hours.50 While the staff's 
reasoning is understandable, the decision had the effect of depriving 
both sides of the kind of precise data needed for an effective analysis 
of the potential of wind power backfeed.61 
C. Looking Toward Mutual Reinforcement 
On balance, the revised tariff set in the Windmill Case has estab-
lished a minimal air of cooperation. But certain negative precedents 
were also created. As the Commission staff noted, "[ t]he proposed 
tariff does little to encourage the use of windmills. Thus, a decision 
would have to be made in this instance of balancing cost justifica-
tion with stimulating energy conservation."52 Looking beyond the 
particular case, however, there should be a more enlightened recog-
nition of the fact that interconnections among big and small power 
suppliers, if done on a sufficiently wide scale, can reduce the need 
for duplicative energy facilities and help the overall efficiencies of 
a transmission system. 
Gainesville Utilities Dep't v. Florida Power Corp.53 is a case with 
striking analogies to the Windmill Case on the question of inter-
connection. There, the Federal Power Commission had exercised its 
authority under §202(b) of the Federal Power Act54 to force a huge, 
21,000 square mile utility (Florida Power) to interconnect its grid 
with a tiny, 22 square mile municipal electrical system (Gaines-
.. Id . 
.. Id. The Commission staff estimated this cost at $20-$30 per month minimum. 
I. One wonders why the federal government was not approached for the funds to support 
this experiment, some $9,000 to meter and computerize the backfeed data. The U.S. Com-
munity Services Administration and the new Department of Energy are two possibilities . 
.. Staff Report, supra note 9, at 10 . 
.... 402 U.S. 515 (1971) . 
.. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970). 
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ville}. The FPC had refused to let Florida Power collect $150,000 
annually from Gainesville for the mere privilege of standby or 
backup service from the interconnection. 55 This standby charge, 
analogous to the "minimum customer charge" that Con Ed success-
fully levied upon the windmill owners, was disallowed because of a 
finding that Florida Power would also receive "substantial and im-
portant benefits"56 in the form of fiscal savings and corporate effi-
ciencies. The FPC determined that the smaller utility was providing 
backup or standby service to the larger utility; that it would trans-
mit any surplus power it might produce into Florida Power's lines; 
and that, therefore, mutual consideration was given for the inter-
connection according to the producers' proportionate capacities. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the FPC position, stating that the 
FPC had correctly applied a "proportionate burden" testY 
In the Windmill Case, seeds of the same sort of beneficial inter-
connection exist. Had the Commission applied the "proportionate 
burden" analysis of Gainesville Utilities to the wind power problem, 
it might have more favorably construed the mutual benefits of the 
relationship. The windmill, like Gainesville's municipal plant, con-
tributed at times of excess production to Con Ed's overall power 
supply. Of course, it is difficult to conceive of how one or a few 
backfeeding windmills can make a lasting contribution to system-
wide production efficiencies in a dispersed commercial grid. Theo-
retically, however, a profusion of windplants scattered over a wide 
geographic area would ensure that at any given moment a few or 
many windmills would be backfeeding-and would likely be foster-
ing a minimum level of constantly backfeeding power. If such a 
scale of backfeed production could be attained, it would pose impor-
tant questions as to the postures to be taken by commercial utilities 
and state regulatory bodies. 
III. FROM ApPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY TO PEOPLE'S POWER 
A. Forming a Federation of Wind-Gennies 
The Windmill Case portends a lasting change in the nature of 
utility-customer relations. No longer can the consumer be regarded 
50 The $150,000 would have paid only for the "effecting" of backup service from the inter-
connection, that is, the mere privilege of access by Gainesville to Florida Power's excess 
capacity, and not for any actual electric service. Gainesville Utilities Dep't. v. Florida Power 
Corp., 402 U.S. 515, 522 (1971). 
50 Id. at 524. 
" [d. at 528-29. 
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only as a passive end-user of power; rather, the consumer may also 
be a producer. However, given the pioneering aspects of the case, 
and the hostility-for hostility it was58-between Con Ed and the 
windmill owners, there is reason to question the survival of alterna-
tive energy systems beyond the New York experiment. A'variety of 
legal obstacles, many of which will be inspired by the very nature 
of the utility regulatory structure, may arise to block the potential 
for wind power. 
As mentioned previously, there are few if any technical bugs 
which would stop the spread of household-scale wind power.58 If 
several thousand windmills were utilized throughout a utility sys-
tem, it is almost certain that there would be a constant, albeit 
minimal, flow of electricity from some of these generators.80 Utilities 
would have to account for these facilities in planning for their own 
capital needs. And it is conceivable that backfeeding could signifi-
cantly affect the ownership, generation, and distribution patterns of 
the typical electricity market. 
The modern electricity market is actually three-staged.81 When 
utilities need power in excess of their own generating capacity, they 
purchase through the so-called "transmission market, "82 basically 
the interconnections of huge regional utility slYstems. Many large 
electric companies sell their surplus power to a remote purchaser by 
using the lines of an intermediary utility. In this process, known as 
"wheeling, "83 the intermediary becomes, in effect, a common car-
rier. The second level of the marketplace is the "wholesale mar-
ket,"84 where a utility company either purchases power or generates 
its own with wholesale-cost fuel, labor, and equipment. Wholesale 
power is resold either in the transmission market or the "local retail 
distribution market,"85 the third tier. 
Presumably, the local commercial utility would retain its domi-
nance over the local retail market. However, it could not totally pre-
58 "When the windmill was installed last fall, Con Ed executives threatened to shut off the 
building's electricity supply if the mill continued to feed power into the company's grid," THE 
POWER LINE, supra note 10, at 1. 
50 See text at note 21, supra. 
II "Diversity with a large number of [wind generation] units in the system smooths out 
the supply [of electricity] to the utility very materially." CLARK, supra note 16, at 546. 
" See Garfield, supra note 7, at 789 . 
• 2 [d. 
13 S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 115 
(1974) . 
.. Garfield, supra note 7, at 789 . 
.. [d. 
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empt power generation in its jurisdiction if a sufficient number of 
windplants were backfeeding.88 The utility would have some degree 
of dependence upon the windmills for a portion of its available 
supplies, thus the utility would be susceptible to an organized 
threat from an aggregation of windplant owners. 
The scenario of a federation of windmill owners extorting more 
favorable electricity rates from a local utility conjures up the spectre 
of collective bargaining. True collective bargaining, however, in-
volves employee unions in mass negotiation with employers. Analy-
sis of the private windmill owner's relation with their local utility 
implies not a master-servant or employer-employee linkage, but a 
free agent or independent contractor status.87 This conclusion is 
based upon the nature of wind power generation; although a pre-
dictable monthly average output can be approximated, the condi-
tions of production are left up to nature and the whims of the private 
owner. As an independent contractor, the private windmill owner 
would not be endowed with the extensive collective bargaining 
rights and protections granted by the Taft-Hartley Act as amended 
by the Landrum-Griffin Act.88 A federation of household-scale wind-
plant owners could not engage in legally-sanctioned and regulated 
collective bargaining under existing statutes. However, certainly a 
group of windmill owners could federate and engage actively in 
negotiations with local utilities to determine on what terms wind-
power will continue to be supplied to a company.8U 
A major ramification of this hypothetical federation's entry into 
the utility marketplace would be a change in the philosophy of state 
regulation of utility service. Regulatory activity at the state level 
tends to be protectivistic; in exchange for the privilege of a monop-
oly franchise to sell electricity, the utility company submits itself 
.. Not waiting for independent competition, one of Con Ed's northeastern utility brethren, 
New England Telephone Company, has installed a 3 Kilowatt-plus windmill generator on 
Block Island, Rhode Island, to provide "a substantial portion of the phone company's electric 
requirements on the island. When the wind is low, electricity is drawn from the Block Island 
Power Company. However, when the windmill produces excess electricity, it is fed back to 
the power company." CATALYST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Oct. 1977, at 42. 
" See W. SELL, AGENCY §11 (1975): 
In general, an independent contractor is one whom while exercising independent employ-
ment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without the control 
of the employer as to his physical conduct, except as to result. However, there are some 
independent contractors who are not agents because they are not subject to their em-
ployer's control as to the details of the work and are not fiduciaries . 
.. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 49 Stat. 450 (1959), amending, 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1947), defines 
"employee" to exclude "independent contractors" from coverage by the Acts . 
•• See generally CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 113 (1965). 
-------- ----------------~ -------
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to regulation ofrates and income.70 An independent, new utility will 
usually encounter considerable regulatory obstacles prior to licens-
ing.71 However, semi-dependent power sources, such as wind energy 
systems, present regulators with a means for promoting efficiency 
in existing power grids. Backfeeding wind plants overlap into exist-
ing utility systems, supplement rather than duplicate generating 
capacity, and foster lower rates to consumers. By allowing windmill 
generators on a case-by-case basis in order to promote system-wide 
efficiency, state regulatory agencies could, in effect, confer upon this 
alternative energy source a de facto finding of public convenience 
and necessity. 
B. Beyond the Local Grid 
So much for the limited use of residential windmills:72 what of the 
wishes of a theoretical federation of thousands of windplants which 
are backfeeding a large, steady supply of electricity into a utility 
system? If it attempts to compete with its utility to sell electricity 
on the wholesale market, a windmill federation would have to use 
the utility as its common carrier to "wheel"73 its power to third 
parties. Wheeling would become the central issue. 
An especially recalcitrant or stubborn utility could make it eco-
nomically prohibitive for windmill owners to transmit electricity 
beyond the utility's grid through, for example, high charges for use 
of the company's lines.74 Such balks by the utility could cast it in 
the role of an unfair competitor. 
While the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)15 has 
7. Garfield, supra note 7, at 787. 
71 See Cottonwood Mall Shop. Ctr., Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36 (1971), 
where a small coal plant built to provide power to tenants of a shopping mall was held to 
pose direct competition with the local utility. The court affirmed that the requisite of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity had to be met before the mall could compete 
in supplying electricity. 
72 To this point, discussion has centered around the means by which windmill backfeed 
could make a local grid more efficient. This process, known as "pooling," requires inter-
connection between two or more suppliers, transmission reliability, and central dispatching 
of power. BREYER & MACAVOY, supra note 63, at 97. 
73 [d. at 115. 
" But the utility's surcharges would probably have to be very high to discourage backfeed 
transmissions. One wind energy authority put the per-kilowatt costs of wind vs. nuclear 
generated electricity at less than one-seventh the expense. See Heronemus, Wind Power: A 
Near- Term Partial Solution to the Energy Crisis, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON ENERGY 374 (C. Ruedi-
sili & M. Firebaugh eds. 1975) . 
.. The FERC succeeded to the functions of the Federal Power Commission pursuant to 
Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 583 (1977), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §7172. 
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not historically interpreted its enabling legislation to allow it to 
force a utility to wheel electricity,16 economic theory77 and the prac-
tical need for flexibility in the accommodation of alternate tech-
nology may dictate differently. Even if the FERC refuses to inter-
cede directly in antitrust proceedings against a recalcitrant regional 
power consortium to compel competitive behavior, there are indi-
rect ways by which that agency may act to force the same result. 
The FERC can, and indeed must, take anticompetitive utility prac-
tices into consideration prior to authorizing certain utility financing 
activities, such as bond issues.78 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
upheld an order requiring a utility to sell wholesale power to small 
local retail utilities. In the case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States,79 the FPC had forced Otter Tail Power Company to wheel 
federally-generated hydroelectric power through its lines.80 The 
Court held that the FPC may compel a utility to wheel power on 
grounds that the action is "necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest,"81 and that the public interest standard outweighs mere 
civil antitrust considerations.82 Thus it would appear that the FERC 
has the potential to become a formidable "first line" of review83 over 
anti competitive utility practices which limit entry into the power 
market by appropriate technologies. And if the FERC refuses to 
take action, the small utilities can. In Otter Tail, the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of a civil antitrust action by several municipal 
utilities against the recalcitrant larger company, holding that 
"there is no basis for concluding that the limited authority of the 
Federal Power Commission to order interconnections was intended 
to be a substitute for, or to immunize Otter Tail from, antitrust 
regulation for refusing to deal with municipal corporations."84 
7. See 16 U.S.C. §824a(b) (1970). The FERC has no authority in ordering an interconnec-
tion between utilities "to compel ... [aj public utility to sell or exchange energy when to 
do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers." [d. See also BREYER 
& MACAVOY, supra note 63, at 115, which discusses both the FERC's (FPC's) narrow construc-
tion of its own capacity to compel wheeling, and possible alternatives to those earlier interpre-
tations. 
11 "[Cjommon carrier status may be employed to require the kind of even-handed eco-
nomic justice to users of the service of common carriers which facilitates entry at other 
levels." J. Nelson, "Entry Into Power Markets," 1 REGULATION AND ENTRY: ENERGY, COMMUNI-
CATIONS AND BANKING 75 (M. Klass & W. Sheperd eds. 1976). 
78 See Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 474 (1973). 
7. 410 U.S. 366 (1973) . 
.. [d. at 373. 
81 [d . 
.. [d. 
83 [d . 
.. [d. at 374. 
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Access to the wholesale power market and to transmission rights 
in general are integral to realization of the long-term commercial 
practicality of wind power. Until public utilities themselves follow 
the lead of the Vermont Public Service Corporation of a generation 
and a half ago,85 the spread of wind power will be sporadic and 
grassroots in character. A federation of small windmill owners and 
advocates pressing for commercial treatment of their backfeed en-
ergy could go a long way toward modifying the aura of the "natural 
monopoly" in which most utilities are shrouded. In the process, 
wind plant proprietors could also induce more energetic antitrust 
activity in the power transmission and production areas. The fed-
eral forum may be the most appropriate mechanism for such resolu-
tion because of the national scope of the "energy crisis." The awak-
ening of greater federal leadership88 and more stringent policy-
making at the national level in matters of energy might be the most 
significant factors in overcoming utility monopolism. 
IV. SOME ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Implications for Utilities 
In establishing utility rates, regulatory agencies first compute a 
"rate base. "87 They then calculate a fair rate of return-the utility's 
allowable profit, expressed as a percentage of the base.88 The larger 
the rate base, the larger the actual profit, even if the rate of return 
is relatively low. For example, if the rate of return is 5%, the actual 
profit differs greatly when applied to a rate base of $100 ($5 profit) 
versus a rate base of $1,000 ($50 profit). Oversimplified as this ex-
planation may be, it is inescapable that utilities often invest heavily 
in plant and equipment, thus building up their rate bases, in order 
to maximize profits. 
"" See text at note 18, supra . 
.. President Jimmy Carter's 1977 energy package alluded to the need for legal regulation 
of utilities to keep them from unfairly discriminating against alternative, privately-held, 
energy sources. President Carter's National Energy Plan (White House Doc., April 29, 1977), 
reprinted in, 21 ENERGY USERS REPORT 0715, 0719 (1977) [hereinafter cited as National En-
ergy Plan]. 
" The rate base is comprised of utility property dedicated to generating or providing 
service. Employee costs, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities expenses, etc., are costed 
into this property by various allocational and accounting methods. See M. FARRIS & R. 
SAMPSON, PUBUC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP 80 (1973) . 
.. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), an early regulatory case which articulated many 
of the factors commonly used in computing rates of return: original costs of construction; 
expenditures for permanent improvements; bond and stock values; present vs. original costs 
of construction; probable earning capacity; and operating expenses. 
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For most commercial utilities, wind power will not prove a viable 
alternative source of power generation for at least two reasons. First, 
it is comparatively inexpensive per installed kilowatt of generating 
capacity,89 and thus is not an attractive asset from the perspective 
of building a large capital base upon which to calculate rates. Sec-
ond, wind power is most likely at this time to develop on a 
household-by-household basis, due to the greater efficiency of wind 
power in its direct household application, and windmills adopted by 
private owners will not be includable in utilities' rate bases unless 
leased or cooperatively owned or financed by utility companies. 
A continuous level of backfeed from numerous windmills would 
cause the utility to use its own capacity less; over the short term, 
in fact, utility plans to expand facilities might be curtailed. Wide-
spread use of windmills owned by private operators might even 
hamper a utility's cash flow, assuming monthly fluctuations of the 
amounts of electricity which would have to be bought from, or cred-
ited to, windplant owners. Hence, the proliferation of wind genera-
tion in the coming decade could have a drastic effect on utility 
construction plans. Aside from the direct impact this phenomenon 
would have on rate bases, other profit-related mechanisms, such as 
federal tax advantages for depreciation, would become less lucrative 
as fewer assets were added into the utility base. In addition, with a 
large number of windmills tied into a grid, the regulatory commis-
sions might begin to exclude unneeded corporate facilities from util-
ity rate bases, thus further straining utility cash flow problems. 
B. Ramifications for the Windmill Owner 
The potential proliferation of wind power also presents economic 
considerations and obstacles for windmill owners. The major barrier 
for the small owner is the initial cash outlay for equipment. Other 
factors which threaten the economic attractiveness of wind power 
are the engineering requirements and possible government or utility 
inspections which are necessary, but likely expensive, evils.90 
Some relief might be attainable through the Internal Revenue 
Code. Foremost among the possibilities is the prospect of tax incen-
tives for alternative energy uses, part of the ballyhooed energy pro-
•• Heronemus, supra note 74. 
II See Staff Report, supra note 9, at 8·9, where the Commission staff considered the merits 
of engineering and inspection certifications for wind mills included in the 25-windmill experi-
ment. 
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gram of the Carter administration.91 A more traditional possibility 
is the classification of windplants as assets held in the conduct of a 
"trade or business." In that circumstance, the owner could avail 
him/herself of tax benefits typically accorded to businesses-
depreciation,92 investment credits,93 and deductions for mainte-
nance,94 among others. Although it might appear farfetched to 
view the residential use of wind power as a business, at least two 
conceptual tacks may be taken toward this result. The first is direct: 
if the utility grants the windmill owner "credit for self-generation,"95 
as was the arrangement in the Windmill Case, then the windmill 
owner effectively receives noncash "income."98 If the generation 
credit is considered income, then that portion of the cost of main-
taining the windmill which reflects the portion of its capacity which 
was "sold" to the utility as backfeed may be seen as a business-
related expense. However, before a tax deduction can be taken for 
a business-related use of one's home, that portion of one's residence 
used for business purposes must be set aside exclusively and used 
regularly for such purposes;97 split business and personal uses are 
generally not allowable. us A windmill could not be exclusively de-
voted to business purposes, inasmuch as backfeed, by definition, is 
the part-time transmission of excess energy from the windmill. 
A second approach might to be consider the windmill as being 
"rented" to the utility which benefits from its backfeed. This ap-
proach would necessitate its being rented for a variable or sliding 
period of time each month, with the credit for self-generation being 
construed as rental income.uu The windmill would not have to be 
actually income-producing, so long as it was being held for the pro-
duction of rents or royalties. loo Deductibles would include interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and other "ordinary and necessary" expenses. lUI 
" National Energy Plan, supra note 86, at 0721. 
.2 I.R.C. § 167 . 
• 3 [d. § § 38, 46 . 
.. [d. § 212(2). 
,. See Staff Report, supra note 9, at 6 . 
.. Such noncash income would be taxable under I.R.C. § 61(a)(2), which covers all "gross 
income derived from business." 
t7 [d. § 280; see also [1977] MASTER TAX GUIDE (CCH) § 1067. 
,. I.R.C. § 280 . 
.. [1977] MASTER TAX GUIDE (CCH) § 1004. 
'08 I.R.C. § 212(2). "In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during taxable year: . . . (2) for the 
management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income." 
'0' TREAS. REG. § 1.212-1 (1953). 
510 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:491 
The rental or lease approach may prove to be the most convenient 
business arrangement for backfeed power because it circumvents 
the problems of devoting residential property exclusively to business 
purposes. 
It is important to obtain clarifications of these and other possible 
tax benefits as soon as possible, while the national mood is more 
receptive than ever to energy-related tax incentives. Tax benefits of 
this sort might encourage many households which could finance 
small-scale alternative energy technologies to use them. As with 
most grassroots movements, middle-class acceptance may be cru-
cial to its success. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Wind power is one of the most readily adaptable alternative tech-
nologies. Its technical feasibility has been demonstrated, and, de-
spite the arrangements of the Windmill Case, its economics are not 
prohibitive. The Windmill Case highlights the possible ramifica-
tions of widespread consumer production of electricity. Neverthe-
less, many institutional obstacles and more than a few political 
battles lie ahead. The regulatory systems, both state and federal, 
are ingrown and closely tied to protecting the status quo of the 
utility industry. Antitrust questions will arise as a heretofore dor-
mant subclass of alternative technologists grows in size and voice. 
Perhaps the most persuasive advocacy of appropriate technolo-
gies will not be rational arguments concerning their self-
renewability of supply, their pollution-free characteristics, their 
ease of adaptability, or their "low technology." Rather, economics 
may be the most impressive factor, particularly when combined 
with personal desires for independence from manipulative, multina-
tional energy consortia. If appropriate technology is to become a 
national movement, it must help in forging a completely changed 
view of both the role and control of energy production in this coun-
try. But more inevitably, "as prices continue to climb and resources 
diminish, more and more people will find themselves resorting to 
appropriate technology, whether or not they call it that."lo2 When 
they do, the consumer will become the producer. By making power, 
people will be taking power . 
... Holden, supra note 15, at 859. 
